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INRE STARLINK CoR/'. THE LINK BETWEEN GENETICALLY
DAMAGED CROPS AND AN INADEQUATE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
LINDA BEEBE
Countries around the world either are debating the issues surrounding
tort liability for producers of genetically modified organisms ("GMO"s). In
the United States, the recent StarLink Corn decision shed some light on this
issue.' This Note explores the question of tort liability for GMO producers in
light of the current regulatory framework, discusses state common law in
light of StarLink Corn, and calls for statutory clarification of the issue. This
Note considers the uncertainties and gaps in the current regulatory framework
for biotechnology and its role in the "StarLink saga,"2 examining the
functions of the three primary federal agencies involved in regulating
biotechnology, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and the United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA"). The StarLink Corn decision reveals that "the United
States' piecemeal approach to biotechnology regulation" produces "a
recovery scheme in which it is difficult for plaintiffs ... to prevail."3
I. BACKGROUND
The "StarLink saga7' began when Aventis CropScience ("Aventis")
produced a genetically engineered corn seed called Starlink.5 Aventis
produced this seed by injecting a common bacterium, bacillus thuringiensis
(Bt), into the corn.6 Its purpose was to produce a protein called Cry9C that is
'In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, Marvin Kramer v. Aventis Crop Science
USA Holding, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).2 D.L. Uchtnann, StarLinkTM-A Case Study ofAgricultural Biotechnology Regulation, 7
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159, 160 (2002).
Bryan A. Endres, "GMO": Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary
Obligation? The Liability Schemesfor GMO Damage in the United States and the European
Union, 22 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 453, 493 (2000).
,4 Uchtmann, supra note 2, at 160.
'Id.; StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
6 Uchtmann, supra note 2, at 160.
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toxic to certain insects.7 There are other types of Bt corn that use other pro-
teins, but Cry9C is more stable and takes longer to break down.'
Aventis applied to register StarLink with EPA, which is responsible for
regulating insecticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA").9 EPA determined that Cry9C possessed some
characteristics similar to known human allergens."0 Therefore, the Agency
assigned StarLink a limited registration, allowing its use for non-food indus-
trial purposes, such as animal fodder, but barring its use in products intended
for human consumption."
As a result of EPA's limited registration, StarLink corn had to be sep-
arated from all other corn on the market. Standard commercial corn farming
methods made this segregation difficult. 3 Wide-ranging precautions were
necessary. Corn reproduces by transferring pollen from plant to plant. 4 When
it is in the air, corn pollen can drift very far from where it was originally
planted. 5This drift causes cross-breeding between different corn varieties.'
6
Cross-breeding is accepted and normal, but segregation of different types of
corn is uncommon. 7 After corn is harvested, it is commingled at the indi-
vidual farm.' 8 Then, corn from individual farms are commingled again when
it is shipped and yet again when it is stored in grain elevators.' 9 There is no
set procedure for segregating corn in elevators, storage, or transportation
facilities.2"
Aware of the processes employed in the growing, harvesting, and distri-
buting of corn, EPA issued Aventis a limited registration, requiring special
procedures, for StarLink corn.2' First, StarLink could only be used in animal
feed, industrial non-food uses such as ethanol production, and seed increase.2
7 1d. at 161.8 ld.
9 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
" StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
t Id.
12 Id.
13 1id.
14 Id.
1 Id.
16 Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834.17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
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Second, there was to be "a 660-foot 'buffer zone' around StarLink corn crops
to prevent cross-pollination with non-StarLink corn plants" and any corn
grown within 660 feet of StarLink corn must also only be used as animal feed
or for industrial non-food uses.23 Third, the limited registration placed respon-
sibility for implementing these restrictions with Aventis."4 EPA stipulated
that Aventis was obligated:
(a) to inform farmers of the EPA's requirements for the
planting, cultivation and use of StarLink;
(b) to instruct farmers growing StarLink how to store and
dispose of the StarLink seeds, seed bags, and plant
detritus; and
(c) to ensure that all farmers purchasing StarLink seeds
signed a contract binding them to these terms before
permitting them to grow StarLink corn."
These additional conditions were of utmost importance in controlling the
spread of StarLink corn.
Aventis distributed StarLink corn to farmers across the United States
from May 1998 through October 2000.26 Because of the concerns about
StarLink, the limited registration restricted StarLink farming to one-hundred
and twenty thousand acres.27 In January 1999, EPA agreed to increase this
limit to 2.5 million acres, subject to new safety provisions.28 EPA amended
the registration, requiring Aventis to:
(a) inform purchasers (i.e. "Growers") at the time of Star-
Link seed corn sales, of the need to direct StarLink har-
vest to domestic feed and industrial non-food uses only;
(b) require all Growers to sign a "Grower Agreement" out-
lining field management requirements and stating the
limits on StarLink corn use;
(c) deliver a Grower Guide, restating the provisions stated
in the Grower Agreement, with all seed;
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
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(d) provide all Growers with access to a confidential list of
feed outlets and elevators that direct grain to domestic
feed and industrial uses;
(e) write to Growers prior to planting, reminding them of
the domestic and industrial use requirements for Star-
Link corn;
(f) write to Growers prior to harvest, reminding them of the
domestic and industrial use requirements for StarLink
corn;
(g) conduct a statistically sound follow-up survey of
Growers following harvest, to monitor compliance with
the Grower Agreement.29
Therefore, despite the ultimate result of the "StarLink saga,"3 EPA did
require specific precautions to prevent the commingling of StarLink corn
with other corn.
On September 18, 2000, an article in the Washington Post reported that
a group named Genetically Engineered Food Alert tested Krafl's Taco Bell
Home Originals taco shells and found that they contained small amounts of
Cry9C.31 Taco shells were just the beginning. By October, there were several
reports that food products contained Cry9C. Manufacturers across the country
recalled for their products containing corn, including the Safeway and Kroger
supermarket chains.32
Aventis then submitted a request for EPA to withdraw the StarLink
registration.33 Many domestic food manufacturers ceased using American
corn, opting for foreign corn or traditional corn substitutes, such as feed
wheat.34 Foreign food producers also stopped using American corn. Some
countries went so far as to terminate all American corn imports.35 It became
necessary to test corn at every stage ofproduction. This testing was extremely
29 Id. at 834-35.30 Uchtmarm, supra note 2, at 161.
"' Marc Kaufluan, Biotech Critics Cite Unapproved Corn in Taco Shells; Gene-Modified
Variety Allowed Onlyfor Animal Feed Because ofAllergy Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
2000, at A2; see also Michael R. Taylor & Jody S. Tick, The Starlink Case: Issues for the
Future: Report Commissioned by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 15 (Oct.
2001), available at http://www.rff.org/disc_papers/PDFfiles/0149StarLink_Final.pdf.
32 Taylor & Tick, supra note 31, at 19.
3StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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expensive for farmers, shippers, and storage facilities.3 6 This incident con-
taminated the corn supply and significantly decreased corn prices.3
The StarLink Corn plaintiffs, claimed damages for the decreased corn
prices. The claims were based on "negligence, strict liability, private nui-
sance, public nuisance and conversion,. . . [and] statutory claims.. . under
the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1997 and the North Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act ..."'
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant, Aventis CropScience, Star-
Link's manufacturer, caused the extensive contamination of the corn supply
by failing to comply with EPA's requirements mandated in the limited
registration.39 The farmers alleged that Aventis failed to label certain StarLink
seed packages, as required by the limited registration.' They also claimed
that Aventis did not advise or educate StarLink farmers of EPA mandated re-
strictions on StarLink use, and did not explain "proper segregation procedures
or buffer zone requirements."' They further asserted that Aventis "did not
always require StarLink farmers to sign or adhere to the compulsory, EPA
mandated contracts." '42
The plaintiffs also claimed that in the period leading up to the 2000
growing season, Aventis instructed its "employees that it was unnecessary for
them to advise StarLink farmers to segregate their StarLink corn or to create
buffer zones." '43 This instruction was apparently based on an expectation that
EPA would revise the limited registration and allow StarLink for use in hu-
man food products." EPA did no such thing. In fact, in July 2001, EPA
Scientific Advisory Panel reiterated its earlier finding "that there [was] a
'medium' likelihood that the Cry9C protein [was] a potential allergen.
Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that FIFRA, the Act under
which EPA has authority to regulate pesticides and pesticide labeling,"
36 Id. at 835.
17 Id. at 833.
38 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 836.40 d.
41 id.42 William Ryberg, Growers ofBiotech Corn Say They Weren't Warned, DEs MOINES REG.,
Oct. 25, 2000, at IA.
41 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
"Id.
4' Taylor & Tick, supra note 31, at 25-26; see also StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. at 835.
46 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2002).
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preempted state law.47 The court held that FIFRA preempted all claims
involving a failure to warn.48 The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that
StarLink was a "defective product," holding that the seed companies' "failure
to prevent commingling had nothing to do with the product's design. ' 49 The
court explained that "[c]onfronted with commingling, a manufacturer would
more likely change the warnings than the design."50 The behavior in question
"constitut[ed] a failure to warn, not a design defect, and therefore FIFRA
preempted" claims based on product labeling as well as off-label represen-
tations that merely reiterated label information." The farmers, however, could
"proceed on the theory that defendants (1) violated duties imposed by the
limited registration; (2) made representations to StarLink growers that
contradicted the EPA-approved label; and (3) failed to inform parties hand-
ling StarLink corn downstream of the EPA-approved warnings."52 In ascer-
taining what went wrong in this case, it is first necessary to examine the
regulatory framework that approved StarLink corn.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
USDA, EPA, and FDA share responsibility for the regulation of
biotechnology in the United States.5 3 Currently, there are no regulations
explicitly intended to deal with the problems associated with biotechnology.' 4
Consider the 1986 Reagan Administration's decision, through the Office of
Science and Technology, to issue the Coordinated Framework for the Reg-
ulation of Biotechnology." The Administration decided that present laws
were sufficient to regulate GMOs. The Framework utilized these current laws
instead of "new laws tailored to the challenges of biotechnology, to co-
ordinate regulation of [genetically modified] organisms."56 The regulatory
regime has been criticized as an "almost impenetrable complexity that is
easily capable of discouraging all but the most determined efforts by the
7 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
41 Id. at 838.49 Id. at 837-38.
50 Id. at 838.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Kirsten N. Jabara, The Biosafety Protocol, 8 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 127 (2001).
4 Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights, and the Environment, 50 AM.
J. COMP. L. 215, 223 (Fall 2002).
55 Id.
56 Id.
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uninitiated observer to ascertain how the agencies are fulfilling their
regulatory responsibilities" while at the same time "requir[ing] remarkably
little of the companies that develop and market [genetically modified]
foods."5 7
The United States' regulatory structure is product oriented,5" focusing
on the products of biotechnology, rather than the process by which the
products are created.59 The concept of biotechnology as an industry itself is
therefore not questioned.' In direct contrast to much of the rest of the world,
the United States regulatory structure operates under "a presumption of
safety" in dealing with biotechnology.6 This presumption is called "sub-
stantial equivalence," meaning that as long as genetically modified organisms
were "determined to be substantially equivalent to the parental products...
further safety concerns were likely to be 'insignificant' and the [genetically
modified] food could be treated for regulatory purposes just like the natural
counterpart."62
In practice, the Coordinated Framework places the burden on USDA to
ascertain "whether GMOs are 'safe to grow,"' on EPA to "ensure[] that
GMOs are 'safe for the environment, "' and on FDA to "determine[s] whether
they are 'safe to eat.'
63
" Thomas 0. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified
Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403, 432 (2002).
8 The Coordinated Framework was "based on the principle that [the] techniques of
biotechnology are not inherently risky and that biotechnology should not be regulated as a
process, but rather that the products of biotechnology should be regulated in the same way
as products of other technologies." COMM. ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS:
SCIENCE AND REGULATION 22, 25 (2000).
59George E.C. York, Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal
Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 423, 435-40 (Fall
2001) (comparing the United States' "product school" with the European "process school"
of biotechnology regulation).
6 Id.
6 SeeAlliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (dismissing
an environmental organization's challenge to the FDA's pronouncement, expressing the
opinion that genetically modified food was not materially different from other food); see also
York, supra note 59, at 436.
62 See McGarity, supra note 57, at 428-29. A 1992 working group of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") developed the "substantial equivalent"
test. They suggested that the determination rely on the following factors: "(1) knowledge of
the composition and characteristics of the traditional or parental product or organism; 2)
knowledge of the characteristics of the new component(s) or trait(s) derived... ; [and] 3)
knowledge of the new product/organism with the new components or trait(s) .... " Id.
(quoting ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv., SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS
DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 11 (1992)).
63 Grossman, supra note 54, at 224.
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A. USDA
USDA has authority over genetically modified crops under the Plant
Protection Act ("PPA").' PPA provides USDA with rather narrow authority
to investigate GMOs.65 Under this Act, USDA can regulate the "movement
of organisms that may endanger plant life, and to prevent the introduction,
dissemination or establishment of such organisms."66
USDA deals with genetically modified crops in two different ways.67 If
a genetically modified crop "uses genetic material from a known plant pest,"
the agency issues a permit. 6' A USDA permit, however, is not required for
crops not using "genetic material from a known plant pest."69 In this second
case, the party using the crops is required to give USDA "advance notice of
intent to conduct field trials."70 USDA then has the authority to refuse to
grant authorization, but if it fails to act, authorization is presumed.7 '
USDA also has the authority to identify genetically modified crops as
"non-regulated."72 The developer of the crop can petition USDA for this
status.7 3 Before granting the petition, the agency must decide that the crop is
not a plant pest risk and conduct an Environmental Assessment.7 4 There are
no USDA restrictions on crops that are "non-regulated. 75 Therefore, USDA's
regulation of genetically modified crops extends only to those that use known
plant pests. USDA is only obliged to issue permits for, and therefore is only
obliged to do a comprehensive examination of, genetically modified crops
that use known plant pests.
647 U.S.C. §§ 7711-7712 (2000).
65 Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297, 313 (2002).
6 6d. at 313.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Bratspies, supra note 65, at 313.
72 Id. at 314.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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B. EPA
EPA regulates genetically modified organisms primarily under FIFRA.76
FIFRA regulates pesticide labeling and registration." It authorizes EPA to
evaluate genetically modified organisms with "pesticidal properties. 78
FIFRA requires any party intending to market pesticides commercially to
register with EPA.79 This process is supposed to ensure that the product will
not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."" As Professor
Rebecca Bratspies points out, "[a]bsolute safety is not the goal. 'Unreason-
able' (and therefore forbidden) risk falls somewhere in the realm of harm that
is not certain and risk that is not de minimus."81 It is significant to note that
FIFRA grants EPA power "to exempt whole classes of pesticides" if it con-
cludes that the pesticide is "of a character which is unnecessary to be subject
to this [Act]." 2
EPA also regulates genetically modified plants that contain pesticide
chemicals under the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").83 Under
FDCA, EPA must either set tolerance levels for pesticide residues in foods
or create exemptions from the tolerance levels." EPA, relying on the afore-
mentioned "substantial equivalence doctrine,"85 has created "broad cate-
gorical exemptions" for several genetically modified organisms.8 6 EPA
exempted many genetically modified foods after "conclud[ing] that [they] did
not endanger public health" and "that there was a reasonable certainty that
'aggregate dietary exposure to these modifications' would not cause harm." 7
Overall, EPA has broad discretion regarding the regulation of genetically
modified organisms.
7 Grossman, supra note 54, at 224; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2000).
" Celeste Marie Steen, FIFRA's Preemption of Common Law Tort Actions Involving
Genetically Engineered Pesticides, 38 ARI. L. REv. 763, 766 (1996); see 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136(y).
7 Grossman, supra note 54, at 225; see U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y).
79 Bratspies, supra note 65, at 315.
s 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (2000).
sI Bratspies, supra note 65, at 315-16.
82 McGarity, supra note 57, at 464 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136w(b) (1994)).
" 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
84 Grossman, supra note 54, at 225.95 McGarity, supra note 57, at 467; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
9 McGarity, supra note 57, at 467.
87 Grossman, supra note 54, at 225 (citations omitted).
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C. FDA
FDCA also gives FDA authority to regulate genetically modified organ-
isms.8" Under FDCA, FDA regulates geneticallymodified foods through pro-
visions that allow it to prohibit "adulterated foods."8 9 An "adulterated food"
is a food that "bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which
may render it injurious to health."9 FDA's policy towards genetically mod-
ified foods, in line with the "substantial equivalence doctrine,"' is that they
are not inherently dangerous; it regulates genetically modified foods in the
same manner as regular foods.92
Although FDA otherwise would have jurisdiction over genetically
modified plants, such as StarLink, that contain pesticidal properties, the
agency specifically relinquished this authority in 1992. 93 FDA handed over
all regulatory authority concerning genetically modified plants with pesticidal
characteristics to EPA.94 FDA and EPA concluded that "such plants are in
fact pesticides and thus subject to EPA's exclusivejurisdiction. 95 The policy
statement on the matter admitted that "there may be cases in which the
jurisdictional responsibility for a substance is not clear."96 Confusingly, EPA
does not classify plants genetically modified to be resistant to chemical
herbicides as pesticides. 97 Therefore, these types of GMOs fall only under
FDA's jurisdiction.98
Even more confusingly, FDA biotechnology regulation grants a great
deal of discretion to manufacturers. FDA regulates genetically modified foods
under its authority to regulate food additives.99 A "food additive," however,
is only regulated if the substance "is not generally recognized, among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having
been adequately shown through scientific procedures... to be safe under the
88 Id.
89 McGarity, supra note 57, at 432.
9 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2000).
9' McGarity, supra note 57, at 432.
92 Grossman, supra note 54, at 226.
9' McGarity, supra note 57, at 433.
94 id.
95 Id.
9 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984,
23,005 (May 29, 1992).
97 McGarity, supra note 57, at 433.
98 Id.
99 Grossman, supra note 54, at 225.
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conditions of its intended use.. .. Therefore, many ingredients are not
reviewed because they are labeled "generally recognized as safe"
("GRAS").'0' FDA, in determining ifaproduct is GRAS, determines if"there
is a consensus of expert opinion regarding the safety of the use of the
substance."'0 2 The manufacturer has significant influence on this determin-
ation. 03
D. Comment on the Existing Regulatory Regime
The existing regulatory regime for genetically modified organisms is
confusing. It is controlled by three agencies under laws that never contem-
plated biotechnology.1 4 One commentator, John Charles Kunich, criticized
it as "patchwork" and "a confusing and ineffective regulatory scheme."' 0 5 The
regulatory regime only addresses the issues presented by genetically modified
organisms in a "piecemeal, haphazard fashion."'0 6 Kunich point out that:
There is no federal agency with overarching responsibility for
the topic; rather multiple agencies are charged with
monitoring disparate portions of it, with no effective means
for ensuring comprehensive and consistent coverage. Conse-
quently, there are sizable gaps in coverage, with the con-
comitant risk of significant harms slipping through the cracks
and into the environment. Additionally, proponents of new
and potentially important genetically engineered "products"
21 U.S.C. 321(s) (1994).101 See id.; see also Substances Generally Recognized as Safe, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,938, 18,939 (proposed Apr. 17, 1997).
,02 McGarity, supra note 57, at 437.
103 As McGarity explains,
[I]t is conceivable that a manufacturer could design a brand new food
additive (e.g., through genetic modification techniques), conduct its own
scientific studies, publish the results of those studies in the scientific
literature or circulate them widely (e.g., on the internet), monitor com-
ments from interested scientists, and allow a favorably disposed panel
assembled by a trade association to conclude on the basis of the resulting
'common knowledge' that the substance is GRAS.
Id. at 438.
104 Grossman, supra note 54, at 226.
o John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law
ofGenetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 807, 823-62 (2001).l d. at 823.
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are forced to navigate a confusing maze of agencies and
statutes, with resulting inefficiency and needlessly steep eco-
nomic and opportunity costs and delays for industry and the
general public.'07
Clearly, there are various weaknesses in the government's present method of
regulating genetically modified organisms.
As previously mentioned, in StarLink Corn, EPA issued Aventis an
experimental permit.' °8 EPA labels genetically altered material, such as
StarLink corn, "plant-incorporated protectants."' EPA considers "plant-
incorporated protectants" to be the same as regular chemical pesticides
because they fall under FIFRA's broad definition of pesticide." 0 Therefore,
EPA had jurisdiction to regulate StarLink under FIFRA because it was a
considered a pesticide as well as the portions of FDCA that addressed "pes-
ticide residues in feed and food.""'
The StarLink saga revealed that the current regulatory framework is
insufficient to protect against problems caused by GMOs. It was imprudent
for Aventis to request and for EPA to allow the use of StarLink for feed use
only." 2 In fact, on March 7, 2001, EPA stated that split registrations, such
as those approving StarLink, would "no longer be considered a regulatory
option for products of biotechnology.""' 3 Therefore, the StarLink episode
reveals that there are inadequacies in the regulatory process. These inade-
quacies left the plaintiffs with nowhere to turn but the courts and the tort
system.
107 Id.
"' In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, Marvin Kramer v. Aventis Crop Science
USA Holding, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
"0 Uchtmann, supra note 2, at 183. (quoting Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for Plant-Incorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772,
37,772 (July 19, 2001)).
110 FIFRA defines the term "pesticide" to include any substance "intended for preventing,
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest" or "intended for use as a plant regulator,
defoliant, or desiccant." 7 U.S.C § 136(u)(2000).
Uchtmann, supra note 2, at 183.
See Taylor & Tick, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that "many observers... questioned EPA's
original decision to approve StarLink corn solely for animal use, citing a lack of an
established market infrastructure for maintaining the identity of specific lots of corn and
segregating them from others").
113 Press Release, Dave Deegan & Martha Casey, EPA Releases Draft Report on StarLink
Corn (Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/blab9f485
b098972852562e7004dc686/cd9013801973259885256a0800710574?OpenDocument.
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Ill. TORT THEORIES EMPLOYED IN THE STARLINK CASE
As stated earlier, it was imprudent for EPA to issue the limited registra-
tion; however, it was issued and damage was done. The existing regulatory
regime "does not assign liability for damage to persons, property, and the
environment.""' 4 Therefore, the injured parties in this case, non-StarLink
farmers whose crops were contaminated, filed suit, alleging various theories
of liability."5 The court dismissed some of the claims because they were
preempted by FIFRA and allowed the remaining claims." 6 It is evident from
the court's opinion that there is little clarity on the subject of recovery for
damages caused by genetically modified organisms." 7 The following in-depth
examination of the court's opinion on the various tort theories alleged
emphasizes the need for legislative clarification of the issues.
A. Nuisance
Nuisance is an "invasion of a possessor's interest in the use and
enjoyment ofhis land."'" Although trespass and nuisance sometimes overlap,
courts have distinguished the two based on the nature of the interest infringed
upon."' Nuisance has been called "a term of not very definite meaning."' 2
Many commentators assert that nuisance law is the appropriate method
by which to redress damages from GMOs.' 2' Before the advent of zoning,
nuisance "served as an all-purpose tool of land use regulation."' 22 In the Star-
Link Corn case, the court upheld the nuisance claims because, unlike the
negligence and strict liability claims, they were not preempted by FIFRA. 23
"4 Grossman, supra note 54, at 227.
In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, Marvin Kramer v. Aventis Crop Science
USA Holding, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 828-29 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
116 id.
17 See generally id.
Amelia P. Nelson, Note, Legal Liability in the Wake of StarlinkTM: Who Pays in the
End?, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 241, 258-60 (2002); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
822 (adopted 1977).
"
9 See Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 237 Mich. App. 51 (1999).
20 Thomas P. Redick & Christine G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the Prevention of
'Genetic Pollution ': Declining a Dinner Date With Damocles, [2000] 30 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,328, 10,334 (May 2000).
121 See id.
122 Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 89, 101
(1998).
123 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. at 829.
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Therefore, nuisance will probably be a tort theory on which future plaintiffs
rely when suing GMO manufacturers for damages.
1. Private Nuisance
Private nuisance has been defined as "a nontrespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.' 24 In StarLink
Corn, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants triggered a private nuisance
by marketing StarLink corn seeds when they were aware that the seeds would
commingle with other crops. 25 The court upheld this claim.
26
The central issue to the private nuisance claim was whether the
defendants could be liable for contamination caused by the seeds after the
sale. The defendants argued that they could not be liable for any nuisance
caused by the com because after the farmers purchased the seeds, the
defendants no longer controlled them.' 2 This argument, however, failed
because a defendant's liability extends past original control of the seed,
allowing nuisance liability "not only when he carries on the activity but also
when he participates to a substantial extent in carrying it on. ' '128
Although traditionally, nuisance was applied in cases between two
neighboring landowners, there have been cases where courts upheld the
application of nuisance against the manufacturer of a product that the de-
fendant neighbor was using. For example, courts have found asbestos
manufacturers and gun manufacturers liable for nuisance in certain circum-
stances. 29 In the asbestos case, Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., the
Wisconsin Supreme Court pronounced that "one who has erected a nuisance
will be responsible for its continuance, even after he has parted with the title
and the possession. ... 30 The court relied on Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics
& Co., which held that manufacturers can be liable for creating a nuisance
long after they relinquish ownership or control over their polluting pro-
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 D (adopted 1977).
125 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
I26 d. at 847.
I27 ld. at 845.I28 /d. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 834 (1979)).
1'29 Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d I (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace
& Co., 556 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
130 Northridge Co., 556 N.W.2d at 281-82 (quoting Lohmiller v. Indian Ford Water-Power
Co., 8 N.W. 601, 602 (Wis. 1881)).
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ducts.' 3' Furthermore, comment e to section 834 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts provides for nuisance liability even when the defendant "is no longer
in a position to abate the condition and to stop the harm.' 32 In the gun manu-
facture case, an Illinois appellate court sustained a public nuisance claim by
surviving relatives of individuals shot and killed in Chicago against gun
manufacturers.'33
Cases holding manufacturers liable for nuisance, however, are not in the
majority. 34 The court in the Illinois gun manufacturer case 35 cited a Seventh
Circuit case which failed to hold a chemical manufacturer liable for a cus-
tomer plant's release of chemicals because "[t]he uncontested record shows
that when alerted to the risks associated with [the chemicals], [the manu-
facturer] made every effort to have [the customer] dispose of the chemicals
safely."' 36 The court in Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corp. rejected
nuisance claims against asbestos manufacturers based solely on the fact that
the manufacturer had no access to the product to control it or to abate the
nuisance.'37 Courts clearly disagree on the question of whether or not
manufacturers can be held liable for post-sale nuisances. StarLink Corn,
however, will most likely set a precedent for courts determining liability for
GMO manufacturers.
The decision in the StarLink Corn case stands for the expanded doctrine
of nuisance applicable against manufacturers of nuisance-causing products. '38
This decision elucidates the fact that in the future, courts will look at the
regulatory process in determining liability for nuisance."39 One focus of the
StarLink Corn opinion was the fact that EPA granted Aventis a limited
registration. 4 ' This limited registration created "an affirmative duty to en-
"'1 Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834, cmt. e (1997).
' Young, 765 N.E.2d at 2.
134 Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Camden County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000); City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Bubalo v.
Navegar, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3598 (N.D. Ill. 1998); People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,
761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
135 Id.
36 In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, Marvin Kramer v. Aventis Crop Science
USA Holding, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 845 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (quoting City of Bloomington
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1989)).
a Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
'
38 See StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
139 See id.
140 id.
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force StarLink farmers' compliance with the Grower Agreements."'' The
court felt that this registration "arguably gave Aventis some measure of con-
trol over StarLink's use, as well as a means to abate any nuisance caused by
its misuse."" Therefore, although there is no federal comprehensive GMO
regulation at this point, courts will look to the regulatory process in deter-
mining manufacturer liability for post-sale nuisances.
2. Public Nuisance
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines public nuisance as "an un-
reasonable interference with a right common to the general public."' 43 The
Restatement explains that:
Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference
with a public right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference
with the public health, the public safety, the public
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance
or administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the
actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant
effect upon the public right.' 44
The plaintiff must be able to prove one of these factors to proceed with a
public nuisance claim.
A claim for public nuisance against a GMO manufacturer could be
brought for either pollen drift to wild relatives or commingling of GMOs. 1
45
In the StarLink Corn case, the plaintiffs asserted that the contamination of the
general food corn supply constituted a public nuisance. In a public nuisance
suit, it is necessary for plaintiffs to establish a special harm. 146 The court held
141 Id.
142 Id.
'4- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B (adopted 1977).
1I d.
14 Redick & Bernstein, supra note 120, at 10,335.
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 IC (adopted 1977) (defining special harm as
"harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the
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that the plaintiffs established unique damages because they "depend[ed] on
the integrity of the corn supply for their livelihood.' 47 They explained that
"[c]ommercial corn farmers, as a group, are affected differently than the
general public.' 4' This implies, however, that other citizens could possibly
bring a suit in public nuisance against a GMO manufacturer, but only if they
are able to establish special harms similar to the farmers.
B. Conversion
The plaintiff farmers also claimed conversion. 149 Conversion is defined
as the "intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so
seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may
justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel."'50 The court
dismissed this claim because the plaintiffs retained possession of their com,
the corn was not materially altered, and there was no evidence of intent."
The court rightly dismissed the farmers' conversion claim. Conversion
is inappropriate for the kind of damage inflicted by genetic modification. The
court explained that "[i]t is possible to convert a chattel by altering it, without
completely destroying it. In particular, commingling fungible goods so that
their identity is lost can constitute a conversion."' The change, however,
must be "so material[] ... as to change [the] identity [of the chattel] or [its]
character... '"" The court found that the genetically modified organism in
this case "changed plaintiffs' yield from being corn fit for human consump-
tion to corn fit only for domestic or industrial use."'14 The court emphasized
that the farmers could still utilize their corn for the purpose for which it was
originally intended, sale on the open market. Although after StarLink contam-
ination, the com had considerably depreciated in value, the original purpose
of the corn, to be sold, had not changed.
Conversion differs from trespass to chattels in that trespass to chattels
only requires minor damage for the plaintiff to recover for the diminished
right common to the general public that was the subject of interference").
StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 848.148 id.
149 Id. at 844.
150 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (adopted 1963).
' StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.5
2 Id.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 226.
" StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
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value. ' In a conversion claim, on the other hand, there must be "serious,
major, and important interferences with the right to control the chattel" which
justify requiring the defendant to pay its full value."" 6 The court likened
conversion to a "forced judicial sale."' 7 The court pointed out that the
farmers did not claim that their crops had been stolen or destroyed by defen-
dants. ' The plaintiffs' corn was undeniably altered, but it was still corn. The
court opined that the facts in this case might "lend themselves to a trespass
to chattels, but that it d[id] not rise to the level of conversion."' 5 9
The court's distinction between trespass to chattels and conversion
seems irrelevant. It is interesting that the court, after dismissing the con-
version claim for lack of intent, then suggested that the plaintiffs might have
had a valid claim for trespass to chattels.16 0 This distinction makes sense
when one considers the fact that a plaintiff can recover for depreciation in
value in a trespass to chattels case.16' This distinction does not make sense in
this case, however, as trespass to chattels requires intent 62 and the court
clearly found that the plaintiffs did not claim any intentional commingling
of crops on the defendants' part. 163 Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
217 explains that trespass to chattels "may be committed by intentionally
(a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a
chattel in the possession of another."'" Hence the court's distinction remains
irrelevant.
Additionally, the intent requirement for conversion would probably
preclude use of the conversion doctrine in successful claims against manu-
facturers of genetically modified organisms. Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 224 explains that conversion requires intent. 65 The StarLink Corn
court held that "[e]ven if defendants negligently failed to prevent cross-
pollination and commingling, they would not be liable for conversion."' It
would be difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to demonstrate that any
155 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218, cmt. d (adopted 1963).
"'
6 Id. at § 222A, cmt. c.
15 7 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A, cmt. c. (adopted 1963).
162Id. § 217.163 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217.
161 Id. at § 224.
w6 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
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GMO manufacturer intentionally contaminated the food supply or encouraged
commingling of crops. There is a clear parallel between this court's refusal
to allow a conversion claim and other courts' reluctance to allow claims for
intentional torts involving pesticide drift.'67
Considering the StarLink Corn case, it is difficult to imagine a claim
involving genetically modified organisms in which the plaintiff could
successfully claim conversion. First, the plaintiff would have to establish that
the damage to the organism was so severe that it was akin to destroying the
organism. Second, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the organism
was so materially altered that its identitywas changed. And third, there would
need to be some evidence of intent on the part of the defendant. Proving all
three of these elements seems highly unlikely, especially the intent aspect. It
is foreseeable that genetic engineering could change an organism so much
that it may lose its original character and could no longer be used for the
purpose it was intended, but it is difficult to imagine a case in which a
plaintiff could successfully demonstrate that the defendant actually intended
to cause such damage.
C. Negligence
The plaintiffs in StarLink Corn alleged negligence.16 8 A negligence
claim requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had a duty to exercise
reasonable care, that the defendant breached that duty, that the plaintiff
suffered harm, and that the defendant's breach of duty was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. 69
In the StarLink Corn case, the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer
did not adequately warn them of the risks involved in planting StarLink
seeds.170 FIFRA preempted any claims based on a failure to warn. 7'FIFRA,
"67 See Robert F. Blomquist, Applying Pesticides: Toward Reconceptualizing Liability to
Neighbors For Crop, Livestock and Personal Damages From Agricultural Chemical Drift,
48 OKLA. L. REv. 393, 402-03 (1995).
168 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 843. For another discussion of applying a negligence
theory to damages caused by genetically modified crops, see Nelson, supra note 116, at 260-
61.
169 Endres, supra note 3, at 482-87. The cause-in-fact or "but for" test is also a traditional
element of negligence, but due to current problems with identifying the specific problem
farmer or genetically modified grain developer, this Note will not examine this element. See
id. at 486-87.
170 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35.
' Id. at 835-36; see also supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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as previously mentioned, regulates the use, sale and labeling of pesticides.'72
FIFRA contains no private right of action to redress its violations;173 only
EPA can enforce its provisions. Therefore, FIFRA preempts any claims
amounting to a challenge of EPA-approved label.' 74 There are some claims,
however, that fall outside of FIFRA such as: state remedies for failure to
comply with EPA requirements, 75 commercial representations inconsistent
with product labeling, 76 failure to warn third parties,177 and design defects.
The defendants challenged the duty, proximate causation, and damages
aspects of the negligence claim. 7' The issue of causation was the most con-
tentious. The requirement of buffer zones could be utilized to demonstrate
that injury to neighboring crops was foreseeable and thus involved the
planters' duty of care.' 80 In StarLink Corn, however, the Grower Agreements
created a duty on the defendants' part. 8' Information verifying that Aventis
did not impose the buffer zones or any of the terms of the Grower Agree-
ments would preclude a duty of care on the farmers' part. 2
D. Strict Liability
Strict liability exists when an injury is caused by an activity identified
as "abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous.",1 3 Prevailing on a strict liability
claim does not require that the conduct in question be unreasonable, only that
the activity was abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous.8 4 The StarLink
Corn court dismissed the strict liability claim to the extent that it relied on a
failure to warn because it was preempted by FIFRA.'S'
'
72 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
"73 See id. (failing to mention private right of action).
174 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp 2d at 836.
'7 Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1301 (4th Cir. 1992).
176 Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 47 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1995).
117 New York State Pesticide Coalition v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1989).
... See Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999).179 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
ISO Grossman, supra note 53, at 238.
"' StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 843.182 id.
,83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 520 (adopted 1976). For a discussion of applying
a strict liability theory to damages caused by genetically modified crops, see Nelson, supra
note 38 at 261-63.
184 Grossman, supra note 54, at 237.
S StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 837-38.
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It could be difficult to prove that planting genetically modified crops
constitutes an "abnormally dangerous" activity.8 6 Factors that courts consider
in determining that an activity is abnormally dangerous include:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk... ;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reason-
able care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on;
(f) extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
87
Genetically modified crops offer substantial benefits to society.' 8 Farmers
around the world, especially American farmers, have planted genetically
modified crops, making their use common.'89
There is a strong parallel between cases involving damage from geneti-
cally modified crops and cases involving pesticide drift. 9° In both types of
cases, the matter in question, either GMOs or pesticides, are extremely small
and likely to be spread by the wind.' Some state courts have found in favor
of plaintiffs utilizing strict liability theories seeking to recover for damages
to crops caused by a neighbor's crop dusting.192 The leading case on this
subject is Langan v. Valicopters, Inc.,'9 3 in which plaintiff organic farmers
brought suit against an aerial applicator of pesticides for spraying pesticides
on plaintiff's crops.'94 The Northwest Organic Food Producers' Association
revoked the plaintiffs' certification as organic food growers because of the
contamination.'95 The court affirmed ajuryjudgment in the plaintiff's favor,
386 Grossman, supra note 54, at 237.
387 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 520 (adopted 1976).
188 Id.
I8 York, supra note 59, at 426-27.
190 Grossman, supra note 54, at 238.
191 Id.
192 Id.
19 567 P. 2d 218 (Wash. 1977).
'94MId. at 218.
95 d. at 220.
2004]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
reasoning that the activity of applying pesticides was an "abnormally
dangerous activity." '96
Using a line of reasoning that could easily be applied to genetically
modified crops, the court in Langan found that:
(a) drift from pesticide spraying presented a high risk of
harm;
(b) the gravity of the harm which may result to an adjacent
organic farmer from pesticide application was great;
(c) the risk of pesticide harm to adjacent property owners
could not be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) aerial cropdusting was an activity which was not a mat-
ter of common usage in the area in question;
(e) the application of pesticides adjacent to an organic farm-
ing area was conducted in an inappropriate place; and
(f) that the value of the cropdusting to the community,
while significant, was not determinative. 97
Most courts, however, have not adopted the reasoning of the court in Langan;
instead, they are reluctant to apply strict liability to cases involving pesticide
drift. 9 ' In fact, since Langan, only a handful of cases allowed strict liability
claims in these types of cases."'
Despite the court's refusal to allow a strict liability claim in StarLink
Corn, commentators have argued for years that a strict liability regime for
genetically modified organisms would best address the types of problems
confronted in StarLink Corn.2"" Some scholars argued that merely reforming
the tort system by introducing a more "public" character would make the tort
system more responsive to these types of problems without additional regula-
16 Id. at 221-24.
"I Blomquist, supra note 155, at 403 (citing Langan, 567 P. 2d at 222-23).S9' Id. at 404-05.
'" See Speer & Sons Nursery, Inc. v. Duyck, 759 P.2d 1133 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); SKF Farms
v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); J.L. Wilson Farms, Inc. v.
Wallace, 590 S.W.2d 42 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979); Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 566 P.2d 489 (Or.
1977).
2 See, Note, Designer Genes That Don 't Fit: A Tort Regime For Commercial Releases of
Genetic Engineering Products, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1094-95 (1987) [hereinafter Note,
Designer Genes].
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tory reform.2"' Reforming the tort system, in these commentators' opinions,
is preferable to regulatory reform because it would lower costs.20 2 They argue
that it is also preferable because biotechnology firms are in a superior
position when it comes to knowledge of risks.20 3
These commentators suggest that the tort system should be restructured
in three ways.2 First, they suggest "creating a system of rebuttable pre-
sumptions in order to ease plaintiffs' burdens in proving causation. 5205
Second, they would like to see an "imposition of financial responsibility
requirements, such as mandatory insurance, on biotechnology firms. 20 6
Third, they would like to "create a standard of joint and several strict lia-
bility."207 These suggestions are similar to the German system, which imposes
a relaxed burden of proof for claims involving GMO damage.2" German law
presumes that any damage a GMO causes is the result of biotechnology-
induced characteristics, thus creating a strict liability scheme.209 German law
also requires that parties creating these risks by utilizing GMOs obtain insur-
ance. 2 10 The German system is antithetical to the current "presumption of
safety" used in the United States.1
IV. FIFRA PREEMPTION
As previously mentioned, the court in StarLink Corn found that FIFRA
preempted some of the plaintiffs' strongest claims: those involving a failure
20o Id. at 1092-93.
202 Id. at 1095.
203 Id. at 1093.
Case-by-case reviews by the EPA or other agencies are inefficient to the
extent that they require the government to duplicate this information or
develop the expertise and authority to acquire and digest it. Indeed,
because biotechnology firms can afford to remunerate the field's most
talented scientists according to the market value of their services, the over-
all level of scientific expertise in government will likely lag behind that in
private industry. The tort system should therefore complement direct
regulation in the public management of rDNA releases.
Id. (citations omitted).
204 Id. at 1096.
205 Note, Designer Genes, supra note 189, at 1096.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See Endres, supra note 3, at 477.
209 Id.
210 Id.
21' See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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to warn.212 The preeminent case involving the issue of federal preemption is
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, in which the Supreme Court held that the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act ("Cigarette Act") preempted products liability
claims based on failure to warn.213 When Courts utilize Cipollone in deter-
mining FIFRA preemption, "it creates harsh results, foreclosing common law
remedies even where federal safety standards have been violated. 214
Traditionally, courts were hesitant to allow defenses of FIFRA pre-
emption.215 In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Company, an agricultural worker
brought suit after being injured by exposure to an herbicide. 216 The court held
that FIFRA did not specifically preempt state tort claims "based on
inadequacy of an EPA-approved label. 217 It was not until 1987 in Fitzgerald
v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 218 that courts started upholding FIFRA preemption
defenses, ruling that "state law claims based on negligent labeling and failure
to warn. 21 9 Courts, pointing out that FIFRA uses almost the same language
used in the Cigarette Act, find that they have the same preemptive effects.220
This effect prohibits many otherwise valid claims especially those
claims based on strict liability and negligence. As one commentator, Celeste
Steen, points out that "[t]he United States' choice to regulate genetic engi-
neering under existing laws has resulted in a complex set of regulations and
increased the tension between the federal regulatory scheme and tort law. 221
Most problems regarding GMO's will arise because they are risky and dif-
ficult to control, not because they are defective; this distinction precludes
strict liability claims. Biotechnology, an "ever-changing" field, leaves us with
no real standard of care for negligence claims either.22 Therefore, as Steen
notes:
As a result of the unique nature of GEOs, FIFRA's pre-
emption of all failure to warn claims, even when the company
212 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (2002).
213 505 U.S. 504, 505-06 (1992).
214 Steen, supra note 77, at 770.
2 15 id.
216 736 F.2d 1529, 1531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
217 Steen, supra note 77, at 771.
218 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
219 Id. at 407.
210 In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, Marvin Kramer v. Aventis Crop Science
USA Holding, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (N.D. I1. 2002).
221 Steen, supra note 77, at 791 (citations omitted).
222 id.
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has misinformed EPA, appears to almost eliminate any chan-
ces of recovery from harm caused by GEOs.
FIFRA's inability to efficiently regulate GEOs, com-
bined with the current trend of expanding FIFRA's preemp-
tion of common law damage claims, leads to an unexpected
result. Ironically, many plaintiffs will have their private rights
extinguished precisely because Congress has chosen to pro-
tect health and the environment.223
Clearly, FIFRA preemption is one of the many problems in the current
regulatory regime. It reveals the problems that arise from relying on existing
laws to regulate a completely new set of issues.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The federal government should pass a comprehensive regulatory scheme
regarding genetically modified organisms that includes a liability scheme.
The StarLink Corn case demonstrates that the "patchwork" 224 regulatory
system in place, coupled with state common law creates a situation in which
valid claims are preempted and liability is unclear. 2 5
It would certainly behoove the United States to adopt comprehensive
regulatory and liability schemes for GMOs. There are numerous reasons for
this. First, the United States is by far the world leader in GMO production.
2 6
The United States, however, lags behind when it comes to taking responsi-
bility and regulating biotechnology.227 It is time that the largest GMO pro-
ducing country adopts a clear and comprehensive regulatory scheme per-
taining to these very real issues.
Second, in the past, the United States government's desire was to
encourage the biotechnology industry with their previous laissez-faire regula-
tory scheme. 2 8 The United States, however, is now the established world
leader and, considering most of the world's GMO skeptical attitude, it is
unlikely that this dominance will fade. 229 The only way this dominance will
223 Id. (citations omitted).
224 Kunich, supra note 104, at 823.
225 StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828.
226 See York, supra note 59, at 426-27.
22I Id. at 427.
228 See McGarity, supra note 57, at 404.
229 York, supra note 59, at 426-27.
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fade is if the rest of the world blatantly refuses to accept American agri-
cultural products-this has already occurred.23° In order to increase the confi-
dence of American trading partners, therefore, it is essential that Congress
enact specific measures regulating GMOs and enabling any parties injured by
GMOs to recover, both adequately and readily. At this point, considering the
international debate on the subject, it is the only way to encourage the
burgeoning biotechnology industry.
2 3
'
The third reason the United States should look to the rest of the world
is to increase consumer confidence. Although the American public is clearly
not as opposed to genetic modification as are their European counterparts,
there is growing concern about the possible consequences of genetically
modified food.232 It is difficult to believe educating the public about the
"patchwork ' 233 method in which the United States regulates GMOs would do
anything to decrease this concern. The only way to increase consumer confi-
dence is to adopt reforms, thus forcing real risk assessment, instead of
following vague concepts such as "substantial equivalence '2 34 and "Generally
Recognized as Safe. 235
Lastly, there is no avoiding the concept of globalization. Crops can
commingle across borders. Domestic crops inevitably come into contact with
foreign crops. If the United States fails to account for the possible risks
associated with GMOs, there could be adverse effects outside our borders.
The natural environment has no respect for national boundaries. It is, there-
fore, essential that the United States attempt to alleviate the possible prob-
lems that could arise from its heavy use of genetically modified organisms
before they occur.
The United States could learn a great deal from its allies when it comes
to regulating GMOs. Instead of regulating the finished product as the United
States does, the European Union regulates the entire process.236 The European
230 See, e.g., Endres, supra note 3, at 458 (discussing Mexico's largest tortilla producer's
announcement that it would no longer purchase genetically modified corn-this decision
caused the United States to loose a possible $500 million in annual corn exports).
211 See id. at 458. Deutsche Bank, the largest bank in Europe, "withdrew its previously
positive projections and issued a report warning investors to 'steer clear of companies
associated with GMO crops."' Id.
232 See, e.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000).
233 Kunich, supra note 105, at 823.
, McGarity, supra note 57, at 442.
2'5 Id. at 436.
236 York, supra note 59, at 443 (discussing the European "[p]rocess [s]chool," which is
"concerned with not only the end product of the agri-food industry, but the means by which
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approach requires a separate regulatory response for all agricultural products
that have been produced in non-traditional manners.237 In January 1999, the
European Parliament adopted a measure amending the current EU Directive
regulating GMOs, imposing civil and criminal liability for any damage to
human health or the environment resulting from the deliberate release of
GMOs.238 Directive 90/220 harmonized the approval process for commercial
release of GMOs and their subsequent release into the environment.239 The
United States should emulate this pro-active approach to regulating geneti-
cally modified organisms.
VI. CONCLUSION
StarLink Corn is significant for two reasons. First, it reveals the failure
of the regulatory regime in carelessly issuing a limited registration for
StarLink, which was difficult if not impossible to follow, considering how
corn is cultivated. Second, it reveals how the often unpredictable tort system
fails to fill in the gaps of the regulatory regime. It is time for the United States
to stop ignoring the issue of biotechnology, to stop relying on existing law,
and to implement some serious reforms.
such products are produced"(citations omitted)).
27 Id.
138 Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Amending
Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically
Modified Organisms, 1998 O.J. (C 139) 363 [hereinafter Commission Proposal]; see also
Endres, supra note 3, at 458-59.
9 Commission Proposal, supra note 238.
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